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Soviet Efforts to Achieve Economic Integration: The Causes,
Consequences and Prospects
Robert M. Rosh*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Union of the Soviet Socialists Republics ("USSR") is attempting to
radically reform its economy, through the implementation of Mikhail
Gorbachev's policy of perestroika. 1 Politically and militarily the USSR
continues to be a superpower, but economically it resembles a peripheral
or semi-peripheral country in many respects.2 Soviet economic back-
wardness and isolation are increasingly threatening to undermine its
political and military power,3 a trend which Mr. Gorbachev hopes to
reverse through perestroika.4
This Article contends that while restructuring the Soviet economy is
a prerequisite to integrating it with the rest of the world, restructuring
may in fact only be accomplished through integration. In August 1986,
in order to integrate itself into the world market the USSR applied for
permission to observe the latest rounds of negotiation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") to be held in Geneva.5 In
1987, the USSR began exploring the possibility of joining the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund ("IMF").6 Membership in these two organiza-
tions could provide the USSR with economic resources and greater
access to foreign markets. More importantly, these organizations would
require the USSR to implement economic reforms both before and after
membership were granted. Consequently, if the USSR were to join the
* Assistant Professor of Government and International Relations, Clark University. The Au-
thor wishes to thank Edward Weisband, Beth Rose and Matthew Schwartz for their comments and
suggestions.
I Excerpts from Gorbachev's Report on Restructuring the Soviet Economy, N.Y. Times, June 26,
1987, at AS, col. 1 [hereinafter Gorbachev's Report]. Perestroika means restructuring. Id.
2 See P. DIBB, THE SOVIET UNION: THE INCOMPLETE SUPERPOWER 67-103 (1986). For a
discussion of what differentiates core, semiperipheral, and peripheral economics, see I. WALLER-
STEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1974).
3 P. DIBB, supra note 2.
4 Gorbachev's Report, supra note 1.
5 See Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union To GA 7T, J. WORLD TRADE L. Apr. 1987,
at 23. For the text of the GATT, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter the GATT].
6 See Friedland, IMF. Soviet Soundings, BANKER, June 1987, at 41.
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IMF or the GATT it would be binding itself to international legal com-
mitments, which would provide Mr. Gorbachev with partners in the in-
ternational community who would help him institute economic reforms
even in the face of internal opposition.
This Article will explore the political, economic, and legal causes
and consequences of the USSR's attempt to integrate itself into the world
economy through gaining membership in the GATT and the IMF.
Based on this analysis, this study will conclude that several counter-
vailing factors will prevent the USSR from gaining membership in these
two organizations.
II. THE SOVIET ECONOMY
The USSR is in desperate need of restructuring, a necessity recog-
nized by Mr. Gorbachev.7 Mr. Gorbachev inherited a centrally planned
economy, controlled by Gosplan, a bureaucracy which had been devel-
oped in an effort to replace market mechanisms with planning mecha-
nisms.8 This economic model had achieved great success in providing for
extensive development, but the extraordinary bureaucratization and sub-
sequent politicization of the economy has led to inefficiency and inflex-
ibility of the economy as a whole.' Mr. Gorbachev consequently found
himself in charge of a state with an economy that was unable to compete
as a producer of manufactured and highly technological products in the
world market.' 0 This economy continues to suffer shortages of basic con-
sumer goods such as meat, dairy products, potatoes, shoes and cloth-
ing."' These problems have served to undermine the legitimacy of the
regime as well as to reduce the incentives of individuals to work harder,
since their increased income would not necessarily translate into in-
creased consumption. 2 Mr. Gorbachev recognized that if the economy
were not restructured it would continue to stagnate.' 3
In the USSR, politics intrude upon every level of economic plan-
ning. 4 It is ironic that politics has replaced economics most clearly in
the USSR-a society based on an ideology which analyzes societies pri-
marily by studying economic relations." The politicization of the econ-
omy has resulted from the Communist Party's employment of economic
7 Gorbachev's Report, supra note 1.
8 See M. GOLDMAN, U.S.S.R. IN CRISIS 30-42 (1983).
9 Id.
10 See P. DIBB, supra note 2.
11 See Keller, Soviet Change vs. The Worker's Security, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1988, at Al, col.
12 See id.
13 Gorbachev's Report, supra note 1.
14 D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973).
15 Id. at 85.
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mechanisms as a means of controlling the society, as well as from the
political in-fighting that inevitably occurs between competing compo-
nents of a bureaucracy.
Soviet bureaucratic planning mechanisms were developed, in part,
to replace the socially insensitive workings of the market place.16 Mar-
kets organize exchanges very effectively, transforming complex decisions
involving production and distribution into much simpler ones. 7 If a so-
ciety does not develop a market system, someone will have to face the
complex decisions of what to produce and how to distribute it. To date
no bureaucracy has lived up to that task.18 A bureaucracy lacks the abil-
ity to gather the complete information needed to make rational decisions
regarding production and distribution,' 9 consequently the Soviets have
replaced the flexible hand of the market with a bureaucratic hand of five
thumbs.
Centralized planned economies have a great deal of difficulty estab-
lishing criteria to encourage, control and monitor industrial output. As
Nikita Khrushchev complained, "It has become the tradition to produce
not beautiful chandeliers to adorn homes, but the heaviest chandeliers
possible. This is because the heavier the chandelier produced, the more
the factory gets since its output is calculated in tons."'2
Given that the Soviet state owns the means of production, it almost
always has been unwilling to allow individual firms that were inefficient
to go out of business.2 This unwillingness, compounded by state guar-
anteed employment,2 2 has led to a great deal of "featherbedding," which
ultimately makes Soviet production inefficient on a world scale.2 3 Indus-
trial Darwinism is one of the evils that socialism was designed to pre-
vent; 4 in the USSR the right to a job, housing and medical care are
considered to be human rights.25
The process of Industrial Darwinism, insensitive as it is to human
needs, does provide for technical innovations.2 6 The Soviets have long
sought to compensate for this lack of motivation to innovate by institut-
ing forced accumulation. 27 Accumulation has been a poor substitute,
16 C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 67-68 (1977).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 71.
21 See Keller, supra note 11.
22 M. GOLDMAN, supra note 8.
23 See Keller, supra note 11.
24 See generally J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
25 See Keller, supra note 11, at A12, col. 2.
26 See J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 24.
27 M. GOLDMAN, supra note 8.
19891
CASE W. RES. J INTL LV
however, for the demands of the market place.2" In the Soviet economy
there are few mechanisms which serve to encourage technical innova-
tions,29 but many inadvertently result in the suppression of innovations.
Indeed, the managers of enterprises often fear innovations; if they experi-
ment with such innovations they may fail to meet their output quotas,
whereas if they succeed, new higher quotas may be imposed.30
The Soviet economy has long been insulated from the world market,
and this insulation has reinforced the Soviet's inability to compete in
world markets.31 While economic planning was not the original impetus
for a state economic monopoly over foreign trade and severe limitations
on trade with market economies, 32 if such strictures did not exist, plan-
ning would have been of little value.33 Free trade would destroy the
planning mechanism.34 Consequently, Soviet exports currently must be
funneled through Foreign Trade Organizations that are subject to central
government control.35
Capitalist economies often insulate infant industries from more effi-
cient external competition, but firms in these industries still face internal
competition, and ultimately must compete in the world economy. The
USSR, however, continues to rely on insulation regardless of the matur-
ity of its industrial base, because Soviet industries have not achieved the
degree of efficiency attained by those in the West.36 Prices in the USSR
bear little resemblance to world market prices. 37 They are established
through planning rather than market mechanisms, and in the case of
consumer goods are often subsidized by the state in an effort to maintain
popular support.38 In addition, control over the actions of citizen con-
sumers has been maintained, in part, by the inconvertibility of the
ruble.39
All of these mechanisms have insulated the Soviet economy from
foreign competition, and insulation, in turn, has reinforced the uncompe-
titive nature of the Soviet economy. The policy of perestroika is designed
to redress the inefficiency and uncompetitiveness of the Soviet economy
28 C. LINDBLOM, supra note 16.
29 Id. at 298-99.
30 Id.
31 See P. DIBB, supra note 2.
32 G. A. SMITH, SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE 27 (1973).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 34. All imports and exports must be approved by government
officials. Id.
36 JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., EAST EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 401-30 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT].
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 G.A. SMITH, supra note 32.
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through decentralization and the introduction of market mechanisms.'
Also, as the next section suggests, if the USSR were to join the IMF and
the GATT, the effect would be to encourage, indeed enforce, the restruc-
turing of the Soviet economy.
III. WHY INTEGRATION WOULD SPUR REFORM
Key policy makers in the USSR want their country to join the inter-
national division of labor in order to gain greater access to Western tech-
nological goods, credits and markets. They believe that entering such a
division of labor will make the Soviet economy internationally competi-
tive. In the anarchic system of sovereign states, however, a functional
division of labor between national economies can take place only when
there are -mechanisms which significantly reduce the uncertainties and
insecurities that the interstate system ordinarily generates. Therefore, a
division of labor between states can only arise in a stable and secure envi-
ronment, for interdependence is a rational policy only where there is a
degree of certainty that one will obtain the products that one needs but
did not produce.
It has been suggested that hegemonic dominance or international
regimes allow cooperation to take place over long periods of time.41
The GATT and the IMF have been the two major foundations upon
which an international trade regime has been built.42 The Soviets hope
that by joining the GATT and the IMF they would enjoy more stable
trade and financial relationships with the West, gain access to markets
and financial assets which will help in restructuring the Soviet economy
and gain a degree of influence in these important institutions. Most im-
portantly, joining the IMF, and especially the GATT, might make the
policy of perestroika irreversible.
A number of Mr. Gorbachev's policies are designed to increase So-
viet production of high technology items. For instance, tremendous in-
vestments in the production of computer equipment are being
undertaken in order to achieve an 18% annual growth rate in this area,
40 See Gorbachev's Report, supra note 1.
41 This analysis can be found in R. KEOHANE, AFER HEGEMONY (1984).
42 The concept of international regimes has become widely used in the field of international
relations. The now standard definition of a regime, can be found in Krasner, Regimes And The
Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 497 (1982). Krasner defines a
regime as a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge. Principles are coherent sets of theoretical statements about how the world
works. Norms specify general standards of behavior. Rules and decision-making procedures refer to
specific prescriptions for behavior in clearly defined areas. Krasner gives the example of the liberal
trade regime. The principle is comparative advantage. The norm is that barriers to trade should be
eliminated. The specific rules and decision-making procedures are set out by the GATT.
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and the production of robots is slated to increase by 120% per year.43
The USSR is attempting to replicate internally the ongoing Western
technological revolution, but this process will require the importation of
Western products. The USSR has recently experienced, in a limited
fashion, some of the problems associated with a peripheral role in the
world economy. The value of its natural resource exports, particularly
oil and natural gas, which constitute a large percentage of its hard cur-
rency exports, has fallen dramatically.' By joining the IMF, the USSR
would have greater access to Western financial markets and the capital
necessary to modernize its economy. Increasing the value of Soviet pri-
mary products to pay for these exports could prove difficult, given the
current low price for oil. Consequently, the USSR could well incur large
debts in the next few years, and joining the IMF might help in bridging
any foreign exchange gaps.45
By joining the GATT, the USSR would have greater access to for-
eign markets, and a large market for Soviet goods once they became tech-
nologically competitive. Membership in the GATT would also open the
Soviet economy to foreign competition, thereby hopefully spurring
greater efficiency in Soviet production. Because joining the GATT com-
mits a state to a set of policies which tie a state's hands with respect to
free trade,46 a state is able to accomplish its goal of achieving freer trade
because it is buttressed against the demands of special producers' groups.
Following this line of reasoning, if Mr. Gorbachev succeeded in ob-
taining membership in the GATT for the USSR, he would be better able
to limit the forces in the USSR which are opposed to perestroika.
The USSR would be bound by its article of agreements with the
GATT to pursue economic reforms in order to open the Soviet economy
to the international market. These reforms would be a precondition to
greater international market access for Soviet products. 47  As Mr.
Gorbachev has acknowledged, "I think that the central question is the
question of how to deepen this process (perestroika), how to move for-
ward with perestroika and make it irreversible. 48 Membership in the
GATT might help Mr. Gorbachev answer this central question.
Mr. Gorbachev's proposals for restructuring the Soviet economy
43 SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY ECONOMICS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMIT-
TEE, 100TH CONG., 1ST Sass., GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM: PROBLEMS EMERGE 13-14
(Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter PROBLEMS EMERGE].
44Id.
45 Friedland, supra note 6, at 41 (quoting Jan Vanous).
46 See Roessler, The Scope, Limits, and Function of the GAYT Legal System, 8 WORLD ECON.
287 (1985).
47 See Kennedy, supra note 5.
48 NEWSWEEK, May 30, 1988, at 31.
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have generated much opposition within the USSR.4 9 Political resistance
has been exhibited by enterprise managers who are being asked to in-
crease output and quality simultaneously, as well as from bureaucrats in
the industrial ministry who are fearful of losing their power or even their
positions.5 0 These elites have a strong interest in preserving their polit-
ical base, and decentralization would serve to decrease their political
power."1 Opposition and resentment to Mr. Gorbachev's policies are
also beginning to be exhibited among the Soviet masses. According to
Soviet economists, 16 million people will lose their jobs and require relo-
cation or retraining by the year 2000 as a result of restructuring the So-
viet economy.52 While the Soviet people are accustomed to shortages of
consumer goods, many Soviet workers believe that perestroika will trans-
late into "no vodka, no meat, and no jobs."53
Layoffs in the USSR have begun, but their effects have been cush-
ioned by policies which have provided jobs for all workers who have been
displaced, and reassigned workers who were displeased with their re-
placement jobs. 4 In order to prevent mass discontent and prevent giving
ammunition to his political opponents, Mr. Gorbachev has had to pro-
vide generous pay raises to keep the work force content. 5 To date, these
constraints have limited the extent to which reforms have been insti-
tuted. 6 Membership in the GATT and the IMF, and the agreements
these organizations entail, however, would tie the hands of both Mr.
Gorbachev and his opponents. Soviet accession to these two organiza-
tions would also provide Mr. Gorbachev with external allies and, if need
be, scapegoats in his pursuit of perestroika.
Given Mr. Gorbachev's desire to restructure the Soviet economy,
and the continuing strong internal opposition to his economic policies,
his best hope is to commit his country irreversibly to these reforms.
Gaining membership in the GATT would go far toward achieving this
goal. If the USSR were to join the GATT it would have to accord Most
Favored Nation ("MFN") treatment to all GATT members, observe the
maximum tariff levels, establish a schedule under which to negotiate fur-
ther concessions, limit the use of nontariff barriers, provide genuine mar-
ket access to foreign products, and provide general information
49 PROBLEMS EMERGE, supra note 43.
50 See id
51 See Comisso, Introduction: State Structures, Political Processes, and Collective Choice in
CMEA States, 40 INT'L ORG. 230 (1986).
52 Keller, supra note 11, at A12, col. 3.
53 Id. at Al, col. 1.
54 Id. at Al, col. 2.
55 See id
56 Id
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pertaining to its internal and external economic relations.5 7
Joining the IMF would not automatically require changes in policy
on the part of the USSR. As long as a state is not borrowing money from
the IMF that state can do as it pleases, and it is not bound to any IMF
conditions. 8 Once an agreement for a loan or standby arrangement with
the IMF has been concluded, typically a large number of conditions are
imposed on a country. In order to receive access to IMF funds,59 a coun-
try must: eliminate import controls, reduce or eliminate government sub-
sidies, and achieve the full convertibility of its currency.' Mr.
Gorbachev is attempting to accomplish many of these goals. For in-
stance, the USSR annually spends $115 billion in order to subsidize con-
sumer prices.61 Over half of this goes to subsidizing food staples. 2 Mr.
Gorbachev plans to dramatically decrease these subsidies and eventually
eliminate them, but this could have significant political ramifications.63
By joining the IMF and borrowing money from it, the USSR would gain
access to the financial resources needed to modernize its economy, pro-
vide Soviet policy makers with a convenient scapegoat on which to blame
the social dislocation that restructuring will cause, and prevent the polit-
ical opponents of perestroika from changing Soviet policy.
IV. PRECONDITIONS TO AND CONSEQUENCES OF JOINING THE
GATT AND THE IMF
The preconditions of joining the GATT are greater then those for
the IMF; the consequences of joining the GATT may also be greater,
given that unless the USSR borrowed money from the IMF it would not
be subject to IMF conditions. While a state is supposed to provide de-
tailed information on its balance of payments and its reserves if it wishes
to become a member of the IMF, Poland and Romania, which are mem-
bers of this organization, have not provided the IMF with this economic
information." On the other hand, as a prerequisite to joining the GATT
the USSR would be required to institute a wide range of economic re-
-7 See Herzstein, China and the GA T': Legal and Policy Issues Raised by China's Participation
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 18 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 371, 377-378 (1986).
58 See Friedland, supra note 6, at 42.
59 Access to IMF funds is often a prerequisite to receiving private loans.
60 C. PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE THIRD
WORLD (1974).
61 See Barringer, Bold Transition for Soviets: Flexible Prices and Specter of Inflation, N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1987, § 1, at 12, col. 2. The full convertibility of a state's currency is attained, in
part, through depreciation.
62 See C. PAYER, supra note 60.
63 See Barringer, Soviet Prices: Strawberries Are a Model, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, § 1, at 1,
col. 5.
64 See Friedland, supra note 6, at 42.
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forms, 65 which would result in extensive economic, political and legal
consequences.
The GATT is governed by the norm of reciprocity. When a country
joins the GATT it gains access, through the MFN clause and reduced
tariffs negotiated during the various rounds of the GATT, to the markets
of contracting states.66 In return, a country is traditionally expected to
offer "equivalent" tariff concessions of its own. 67 A problem, however,
arises in the accession of non-market economies because in most cases
the major barriers to trade are not tariffs, but rather are the purchasing
decisions made by economic planners. 68 As discussed, bureaucratic deci-
sion-makers, not the market, allocate goods and services within the econ-
omy, and therefore the reduction of tariffs in a non-market economy does
not necessarily result in an increase in market access for contracting
parties.
The GATT has experienced difficulty in trying to design a method
by which non-market economies reciprocally open their economies to a
prescribed number of imports. 69 The rules of the GATT, which are
designed to eliminate distortions to the market, may be ineffective in
opening up their economies. Reducing tariffs may not increase trade if
the centralized planning mechanism does not decide to allow the
purchase and distribution of foreign products.7 ° Furthermore, a state
centralized economy can also promote exports whose cost does not re-
flect the full cost of production.71
International free trade, however, does not require that all GATT
members follow a laissez-faire philosophy. The articles of the GATT
recognize that there may be appropriate reason for states to intervene in
their own economies, and that it is their sovereign right to do so. 72 In
fact, the GATT does not differentiate between economies or industries
owned by shareholders, the state, the workers, or some combination of
such groups.7 3 Ownership does not matter; but differentiations between
centrally planned and decentralized economies do concern the GATT,
because the articles of the GATT assume that prices are set by the mar-
ket rather than by centralized planners.74
65 See Kennedy, supra note 5.
66 See Herzstein, supra note 57, at 400.
67 See Patterson, Improving GATT Rules for Nonmarket Economies, J. WORLD TRADa L.
Mar.- Apr. 1986, at 185, 187.
68 Herzstein, supra note 57, at 374.
69 Id. at 375.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 376.
72 See the GAIT, supra note 5, art. XI, XII and XIX.
73 See Herzstein, supra note 57, at 375-376.
74 See Roessler, supra note 46, at 295.
1989]
CASE W. RES. J. INTL LV
While a number of centralized planned economies are members of
the GATT, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Poland,"
the contracting parties to the GATT have not been entirely satisfied with
their association with these states.7 6 Market access to centralized
planned economies has been limited in spite of the protocols which were
signed prior to their accession to the GATT.7 7 For instance, Poland's
commitment to increase the dollar value of its imports by 7% a year was
rendered ineffectual by the dollar's subsequent depreciation.7" Poland
was therefore able to increase the dollar value of its imports without nec-
essarily increasing the volume of its imports.7 9
The potential for these states to engage in unfair trading practices
has generated a great deal of concern on the part of states with market
economies.8 ° Unfair trading practices, as defined by the articles of the
GATT, include the selling of products for export at a lower price than
for domestic consumption (dumping)81 as well as the practice of govern-
ments bearing the costs of their exporting enterprises (subsidization). 2
Because the prices of exports by non-market economies are not necessar-
ily governed by the market, and because the composition of exports is not
necessarily determined by comparative advantage, it is difficult to deter-
mine when these economies are engaging in unfair practices.
Under the GATT, a countervailing duty can be imposed by the im-
porting country equaling the amount of the subsidy provided by the ex-
porting country.83 Likewise, a dumping duty can be imposed equal to
the price differential between the price being charged in the exporting
country's internal market and the stated export price. 4 Implementing
these duties, however, requires that price comparisons be made; and
since in centrally planned economies market forces do not determine
prices, there is no internal basis for comparison.85 Since 1957, con-
tracting parties to the GATT have been allowed to use prices for similar
products produced by "surrogate countries" as a means of comparison to
determine whether subsidization or dumping is occurring." This prac-
tice, as well as any conceivable modification of it, ignores the possibility
that a non-market economy could be the most efficient producer of a
75 See Herzstein, supra note 57, at 375.
76 Id.
77 See Patterson, supra note 67, at 186.
78 Id. at 188.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 195-199.
81 Id. at 196.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Patterson, supra note 67, at 197.
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particular product."
The EC, in particular, has been concerned about the evaluation of
non-market economy unfair trading practices and the inadequacies of
traditional methods which guard against such practices. 8 Consequently,
the accession protocols of Poland, Hungary and Romania permit con-
tracting parties to employ discriminatory quantitative restrictions within
certain limitations.8 9
Some commentators maintain that, in spite of these problems, the
GATT is flexible enough to allow the development of protocols that cre-
ate a mutually beneficial relationship between market and centrally
planned economies, including the USSR.9" Others assert that the USSR
will not be allowed to accede to the GATT until its economy is radically
reformed.91 Certainly, the USSR's tremendous potential trade capacity
as well as the possibility that it could employ the planning mechanism to
limit access to the Soviet economy, makes the question of trade imbal-
ances of great importance to the members of the GATT.92 While the
GATT could demand an import commitment from the Soviet Union - a
pledge to increase imports by a specific amount - such commitments
imposed on Poland and Romania have been deemed ineffective.93
States with market economies, the United States in particular, have
already expressed their unwillingness to allow the USSR membership in
the GATT because of its centrally planned economy. 94 In order to pre-
pare effectively for GATT membership, the USSR will have to reform
dramatically its pricing system and allow prices to be determined by the
marketplace. It will not be sufficient for enterprises to set the prices of
their production. These enterprises must be able to purchase all the fac-
tors of production, including labor, at prices determined by the market.
Otherwise prices will fail to reflect the costs of production, thereby dis-
torting access to the Soviet market as well as Soviet entry to the markets
of GATT members. This reform is needed to avoid quarrels over market
access; the consequences, however, of this reform would be to inject a
very large dose of capitalism into the Soviet economy.
A number of scholars have questioned whether the USSR is willing
87 See id
88 Id. at 192-195.
89 Id
90 See, eg., Patterson, supra note 67, passim.
91 See, eg., Kennedy, supra note 5, at 33-39; Herzenstein, supra note 57, at 375.
92 See Herzstein, supra note 57, at 375-376 (Hertzstein makes this same observation with re-
spect to China. China poses perhaps an even greater threat because of its abundant cheap labor
force.)
93 See id at 387.
94 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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to take such a dramatic step.95 Nevertheless, Mr. Gorbachev has served
notice that he wishes to attempt this radical restructuring of the Soviet
economy; indeed, Mr. Gorbachev has even recognized that "[a] radical
reform of the pricing system is a most important part of the economic
overhaul. Without it, a complete transition to the new mechanism is
impossible."'9 6
V. THE LIMITED CHANCES FOR MEMBERSHIP
The economic and perhaps even the political costs of joining the
GATT, in particular, would most likely outweigh the benefits for the
USSR; although membership in the GATT would serve to commit the
USSR to Gorbachev's policies.97 Even if Mr. Gorbachev's policies result
in restructuring the Soviet economy, the USSR might still not be allowed
to join the GATT and the IMF. Indeed, global politics may intrude on
global economics. Furthermore, Mr. Gorbachev's success is far from as-
sured. Radically reforming the Soviet economy will entail enormous
costs, and Mr. Gorbachev's policies have and will continue to generate
opposition among the political elite and the masses.
Conceivably the USSR would not need to restructure its economy in
order to join the IMF. Yet the United States, in particular, is concerned
that if the USSR were to join the IMF, it would attempt to politicize the
debate within this institution.98 Power within the IMF is delegated along
undemocratic lines, with a country's voting percentage equaling its con-
tribution to the IMF.99 Presently the United States effectively has a veto
in this organization, because its contribution is almost equal to the per-
centage of negative votes needed to stop a proposal. "°
Third World countries have been frustrated by both this voting ar-
rangement and the fact that it has led to strict policies being imposed
upon debtors.'0 l The United States is concerned that the USSR would
not act "responsibly" within the IMF and would instead side with the
countries of the Third World.1" 2 U.S. uncertainty as to how the USSR
would act once it were a member has and will most likely continue to
prevent its achieving membership status. 103 Given that the United States
holds the voting strength necessary to veto proposals, it could continue
95 See S. BIALER, THE SOVIET PARADOX: EXTERNAL EXPANSION, INTERNAL DECLINE
(1986); Kennedy, supra note 5.
96 Gorbachev's Report, supra note 1, at A8, col. 5.
97 See Roessler, supra note 46.
98 See Friedland, supra note 6, at 42.
99 C. PAYER, supra note 60.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See Friedland, supra note 6.
103 Id. at 42.
Vol. 21:67
THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE
to block Soviet membership in the IMF indefinitely. A major shift in
U.S. foreign policy would be required before Soviet membership is possi-
ble. Conservative Senate members could conceivably prevent such a shift
even if a new administration were inclined to allow the Soviets to join
this organization.
Even if the USSR were willing to make all the economic reforms
necessary to satisfy the GATT, it is still quite possible that developed
capitalist states, and in particular the United States, would reject its ap-
plication for admission to this organization."° One potential reason for
U.S. opposition is that if the USSR were to join the GATT, the United
States would be less able to employ economic means against the Soviets
in order to achieve political ends. 10 The employment of economic state-
craft is a major tool of U.S. foreign policy toward the USSR, 106 and the
United States has frequently broken bilateral trade agreements with the
USSR in response to a Soviet political or military action.107 If the USSR
were a member of the GATT, and the United States violated the rules of
the GATT in order to prevent or respond to a Soviet action, it could set
an adverse precedent which could later be used against the United States.
It would also allow the USSR to employ this institution to argue on its
own behalf' 0 8
Nevertheless, with respect to the United States, the USSR would not
necessarily obtain many economic advantages even if it joined the
GATT. While the United States generally imposes a 38% tariff on So-
viet products compared to a 2.8% tariff levied on imports in general (be-
cause the USSR has not been granted MFN status), this disparity would
not necessarily be reduced even if the USSR were a member of the
GATT." 9  The USSR would not be granted MFN status from the
United States. Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 °10 (the Jackson-Vanik
amendment) allows the United States to extend such treatment to Com-
munist countries only for limited periods, and renewal of this status is
contingent on a determination that the country is maintaining emigration
104 Id. The USSR failed to take note of a number of technical requirements in its application
for observer status to this Soviet initiative. Neither Kennedy, supra note 5, nor Patterson, supra note
67, make much reference to the effects that the political rivalry between the USSR and the United
States will have on the possibility of Soviet accession to the GAT. Although Kennedy notes that
the United States may have rejected Soviet membership in the GATT in 1986 in part because of
political reasons, he goes on to analyze the possibility of Soviet accession if economic reforms are
instituted and makes no further reference to the fact that the United States and its political allies
might continue to oppose Soviet membership.
105 See D. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFr 206-290 (1985).
106 Id
107 Id.
108 Id See also Herzstein, supra note 57, at 380.
1o9 See Farnsworth, Russia's Effort to Sell in US., N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1987, at Dl, col. 3.
110 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1982). See Herzstein, supra note 57, at 383.
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policies that meet the standards set forth in the Act. I Such an action is
allowable under article XXXV of the GATT, which gives any country
the right to deny the applicability of GATT rules between itself and an
entering country." l Consequently, the U.S. policy of linking economic
policy to human rights and other political issues would continue to pro-
vide numerous political difficulties for the USSR even after attaining
GATT membership. At best, the Soviets could only hope to be granted
temporary MFN status, and such a position is extremely tenuous; for
instance, in 1987 the U.S. Senate voted to repeal Romania's MFN Status
in order to protest Romanian human rights violations. 1 3
The United States has expressed its opposition to Soviet membership
in the GATT because it is a centrally planned economy.1 4 Decentraliz-
ing the Soviet economy would entail certain economic costs. While the
economy of Yugoslavia, for example, 'has experienced rapid industrializa-
tion and increased productivity, this has come at the cost of triple digit
inflation as well as a tremendous increase in its international indebted-
ness. 15 Even if the USSR were willing to pay these economic costs, it is
still possible that the United States would be able to prevent the USSR
from joining the GATT for political reasons. The military and political
rivalry that exists between the United States and the USSR may prevent
them from becoming economically interdependent. Given this political
rivalry, Soviet policy makers would likely balk at the possible political
costs involved, even if the Soviets were willing to pay the economic costs
necessary to join the GATT. Presently these political costs are not read-
ily apparent, because Soviet accession to the GATT is not imminent.
However, if the USSR were granted conditional membership to the
GATT, the potential political costs of joining this organization would
prove to be prohibitive.
VI. THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ALBATROSS
Since World War II, instead of integrating itself into the world econ-
omy, the USSR has sought to develop a division of labor between itself
and the states of Eastern Europe." 6 It has done so in order to amass the
resources necessary to maintain the balance of power system that has
II1 Lansing & Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-Nation Status for
Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARV. INT'L L. J. 343 (1984).
112 See Herzstein, supra note 57, at 383.
113 See Rasky, Senate Suspends Special Trade Status for Romania as Protest on Human Rights
and Emigration Issues, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, at A5, col. 1.
114 See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 23-24.
115 Jovovic, How Much is the IMF Helping Yugoslavia, 37 REv. INT'L AFF. 10 (1986).
116 See Bunce, The Empire Strikes Back The Transformation of The Eastern Bloc from a
Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability, 39 INT'L ORG. 1-46 (1985).
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arisen between itself and the United States. 117 Control over Eastern Eu-
rope has allowed the USSR to compete militarily with the United States,
a country whose economy is currently 55% larger than that of the
USSR.11 Soviet imperial control over this area has provided the insur-
ance necessary to encourage economic integration with and economic de-
velopment of Eastern Europe. 1 9 In turn, the economic integration and
development have solidified the Soviet's imperial control. 120 However,
Soviet control over Eastern Europe may serve to increase the political
costs of joining the IMF and especially the GATT, because even if Mr.
Gorbachev can achieve consensus within the USSR, his efforts may still
be undermined by constraints resulting from the USSR's imperial domi-
nance over Eastern Europe. 121
Soviet integration into the world economy may not be possible until
its empire is dismantled. Longstanding cooperative relations with the
West would be difficult under conditions which might require the Soviets
to intervene into the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. One of the
consequences of joining the IMF and the GATT may be that Soviet pol-
icy makers increasingly would be confronted by the dilemma that the
use of force against a rebellious Eastern European state would be
counter-productive in achieving its economic policies, whereas the non-
application of force would increase dramatically the likelihood that its
empire (and hence its security policy) would unravel.
The four mechanisms of control that the Soviets have employed in
order to maintain their imperial dominance over Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland are: 1) military domination,
2) party penetration and cooperation, 3) economic integration and de-
pendence, and 4) the comparative economic development of these coun-
tries. The latter three mechanisms have been stressed in order to lessen
Soviet dependence on military domination, the exercise of which is very
costly, especially in political terms. 122
Comparative economic development has been encouraged in order
117 Id.
118 See PROBLEMS EMERGE, supra note 43, at 1.
119 M. MARRESE & J. VANOUS, SOVIET SUBSIDIZATION OF TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE:
A SOVIET PERSPECTIVE (1983).
120 Id.
121 See Gaiti, Gorbachev and Eastern Europe, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 958 (1987).
122 Romania is not included because it has consistently been a maverick among Eastern Euro-
pean states and does not fit perfectly within the model being outlined. It openly criticized the
USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1978, it refused to increase its defense expenditures in spite
of the USSR's request to do so. It refused to aid Vietnam against China in 1980. It participated in
the Los Angeles Olympics, and it continues to resist its full integration into both the Warsaw Pact
and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA"). Romania has achieved a large de-
gree of autonomy because it is outside the militarily strategic northern tier, and because its internal
politics, which closely resembles Stalinism, have traditionally posed no threat to the USSR.
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to promote the legitimacy of these governments and lessen their reliance
on the need for direct Soviet intervention.123 The Soviets have subsidized
this effort in part because Eastern Europe's integration into the Warsaw
Pact allows the USSR to benefit militarily from Eastern Europe's eco-
nomic development. 124 However, the security benefits derived from So-
viet imperial control are coming at continuously higher economic costs
- an expense which the Soviets are increasingly unwilling and unable to
bear. 125 At the same time, economic development has brought with it
ever rising Eastern European expectations - expectations that increas-
ingly cannot be met because of Eastern Europe's economic integration
with the USSR, the rigidity of its economic structures and this area's
subsequent inability to integrate fully into the world economy. 126 While
Gorbachev desires economic reforms and greater integration with the
West for both the USSR and Eastern Europe, a constantly worsening
legitimation crisis in Eastern Europe may serve to stymie his efforts.
Soviet leadership will not, however, quickly dissolve an empire that
was so costly to build and so pivotal as to the USSR's Competitiveness
with its major adversaries. As is regularly noted, Eastern Europe is a
buffer zone between the USSR and the West that provides for the strate-
gic basing of troops. 127 The troops of Eastern Europe provide some de-
gree of protection for the USSR through their integration into the
Warsaw Pact. Revenues and resources can be extracted from Eastern
European economies in order to produce weapons within these econo-
mies as well as to help pay for the military hardware produced by the
USSR. 128 The combined economic production of the economies of East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria is equal to al-
most 40% of the Soviet GNP. 129 This economic base allowed Eastern
European armies to provide 36% of the total Warsaw Pact main battle
tanks and 44% of the tactical aircraft in northern and central Europe as
of 1980.130 Eastern Europe's military integration with the USSR has al-
lowed for economic integration, which has enabled the USSR to en-
courage and, in part, subsidize economic development in Eastern
Europe. '3' This development, given Soviet imperial control, can be mo-
bilized by the Soviets in order to maintain a balance of power with the
United States.
123 See Bunce, supra note 116.
124 See M. MARRESE & J. VANOUS, supra note 119.
125 Id.
126 See Bunce, supra note 116.
127 Id.
128 See Johnson, The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe, in SoviET POL-
ICY IN EASTERN EUROPE 257 (S. Terry ed. 1984).
129 See M. MARRESE & J. VANOUS, supra note 119.
130 Johnson, supra note 128 at 257 n. 4.
131 See id. at 257.
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The Council For Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA") is the
organization that has been employed by the USSR to encourage and con-
trol economic integration.132 The coordination of production and trade
in both the military and civilian sectors of the Eastern European econo-
mies is the major task of this organization.133 Interestingly, the eco-
nomic integration that has occurred between the USSR and Eastern
Europe as a result of CMEA's operation has taken a somewhat unusual
form: the Soviets have allowed themselves to enter a division of labor
with what might be construed as a peripheral economic role. They are
the main supplier of Eastern Europe's raw material, especially energy,
needs. In turn, a large percentage of their imports from this area are in
the form of industrial goods including military equipment.134 The USSR
has allowed this to occur first of all because it has within its borders an
enormous supply of many natural resources, and thus such trade maxi-
mizes its factor endowments.135 More importantly, however, oil is the
lifeblood of an industrial economy, and the Soviets, by making Eastern
Europe dependent on the USSR for oil, control the pulse. Soviet energy
policy has become a "key lever" of Soviet political control as a result of
Eastern European energy dependence.
If the USSR were to join the GATT, this would result in a loosening
of Soviet economic control over Eastern Europe by weakening the level
of economic integration achieved by CMEA. Article XIII of the GATT
stipulates that the import and export of goods from and to signatory
countries are to be accorded nondiscriminatory treatment. 36 Any ad-
vantage granted to one country, according to article III, must be granted
to all countries.137 This could pose a problem for the USSR because it
would threaten the countertrade agreements it has with Eastern Euro-
pean countries which are members of the CMEA.131 While tariffs on
inter CMEA trade might be exempt from general MFN treatment be-
cause of the regional integration exception contained within article
XXIV of the GATT, countertrade agreements most likely would be
viewed as constituting a subsidy or quantitative restriction on trade,
which is not allowed under the articles of the GATT.1 39 The elimination
of counter-trade agreements would lessen economic integration between
132 M. MARRESE & J. VANOUS, supra note 119.
133 See Checinski, Warsaw Pact/CMEA Military-Economic Trends, PROBS. COMMUNISM,
Mar.- Apr. 1987, at 15.
134 See Matusek, Eastern Europe: Political Context, in ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 96.
135 See Hardt, Soviet Energy Policy in Eastern Europe, in SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EU-
ROPE, supra note 128, at 208.
136 Liebman, GATT and Countertrade Requirements, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 252, 254
(1984).
137 Jrd
138 Id.
139 Id
1989]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
the USSR and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, any exceptions made to
regional arrangements are only permissible if all the members of this re-
gional group are members of the GATT.1" At present the USSR, East
Germany, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia are not members of
the GATT. In order for CMEA agreements to be recognized all of these
countries would have to join the GATT.141 Membership in this organiza-
tion would give Soviet allies numerous other trading opportunities, and
might therefore weaken their dependence on the USSR - a result not
likely desired by Soviet policy makers.
CMEA provides numerous political and economic benefits to the
leaders of Eastern Europe by insulating their economies from dramatic
price fluctuations in the world economy and by minimizing shortages
that might otherwise arise.142 In particular, Eastern European econo-
mies have not been forced to undergo painful restructuring in order to
achieve energy efficiency because of their access to relatively cheap and
secure energy supplies.143 However, while in the short-run isolation from
world energy markets has helped these economies, in the long term these
benefits have come at the cost of limiting the efficiency and competitive-
ness of Eastern Europe's industries. Indeed, Eastern European countries
are reported to have used on average 40% more energy per unit of GNP
than did EC countries. 144
Like the USSR, the economies of Eastern Europe need economic
reforms, but in all likelihood their leaders could not survive them. Yet
without reforms, these regimes will face increasing economic stagnation
and political turmoil. There is an implicit social contract between the
governments and peoples of Eastern Europe: as long as their standards
of living improved, Eastern Europeans would not challenge the politics
of the regime."14 In the immediate future the economic performance of
Eastern Europe does not appear especially promising. It is ironic to note
that Marxist analyses of crises are probably best applicable to the socie-
ties which claim to be following Marxist tenets. For instance, the Polish
crisis has been aptly characterized as Marx's revenge against Lenin -
economic conditions changing much more rapidly than the superstruc-
ture's ability to cope with the changes.1 46
Mr. Gorbachev, like his predecessors, cannot afford an independent
140 Id. at 259.
141 Id.
142 Matusek, supra note 134.
143 See Hardt, supra note 135.
144 Id. at 213.
145 See Marer, Economic Policies and Options for Eastern Europe, in PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
IN SOCIALIST SYSTEMS 21-22 (C. Bukowski & M. Cichock eds. 1987).
146 See Terry, Soviet Policy In Eastern Europe: The Challenge of the 1980s, in SOVIET POLICY
IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 128, at 350-56.
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and autonomous Eastern Europe. While his regime's rhetoric is less
threatening than those of the past, its requirements from Eastern Europe
are no less encompassing. The Brezhnev Doctrine has not been aban-
doned. 147 If the USSR were to join the GATT and the IMF, thereby
integrating itself into an international division of labor, two of its four
mechanisms of control over Eastern Europe - military domination and
economic integration - would be severely weakened. The USSR would
not be able to intervene militarily into Eastern Europe, because this
would undoubtedly result in severe economic sanctions, which could be
debilitating if the Soviets achieved economic interdependence with the
West. Perhaps more significantly, Eastern Europe's economic integra-
tion with and dependence on the Soviet economy would be dramatically
loosened. While this might relieve the USSR of an economic burden, it
would also weaken an important military alliance.
Mr. Gorbachev often analogizes his role as General Secretary of the
Soviet Union to being captain of a ship. One commentator has implied
that by joining the GATT Gorbachev would be seeking to navigate the
waters of free trade by following Circe's advice to Ulysses on how to sail
safely past the Sirens this advice was, "[H]ave yourself lashed hand and
foot against the mast." '148 Yet, just as the albatross crippled the ancient
mariner, so too might Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe prevent
Gorbachev from setting sail on the course he has mapped out.
Indeed, at some point in the not too distant future the USSR will
need to intervene militarily into Eastern Europe, and this will once again
lead to the political and economic isolation of the USSR. The ultimate
irony may be that Marx and Engels' opening statement in the Commu-
nist Manifesto is now most applicable to the USSR and Eastern Eu-
rope.14 9 Mr. Gorbachev must indeed be haunted by the spectre of a
workers' revolution. If such a revolution were to occur, in Poland for
instance, it would necessarily result in some type of Soviet intervention
into Eastern Europe. Such an intervention would provide an insur-
mountable political hurdle to Soviet membership in the IMF and the
GAIT.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mr. Gorbachev has already scaled obstacles which many scholars
believed to be unconquerable. If the USSR were to join the IMF and the
GATT, this would serve to commit it to pursuing Mr. Gorbachev's pol-
icy of perestroika as well as the integration of the USSR into the world
economy. While joining the GATT, in particular, would require certain
147 See Gaiti, supra note 121, at 970.
148 See Roessler, supra note 46, at 287.
149 See S. BIALER, supra note 95, at 231.
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economic costs without necessarily providing many economic benefits
(because of the legal loopholes contained in the articles of the GATT),
Soviet policy makers have nevertheless expressed their willingness to pur-
sue the reforms needed to achieve membership. In spite of this, it is un-
likely that the USSR will be allowed to join these organizations due to
the opposition of the United States and a number of its allies. Further-
more, while Soviet policy makers may be willing to pay the economic
costs of joining the GATT and the IMF, should the political costs be
seen as including a loss of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, such a
realization would generate tremendous opposition within the Soviet hier-
archy to joining these organizations.
The consequences of joining the IMF and especially the GAIT
would be to make legally binding the policies of perestroika. If the USSR
signed the GAT's Articles of Agreement, it would be committing itself
to reforming and integrating its economy. Tying the hands of Soviet pol-
icy makers through this international legal agreement would bolster Mr.
Gorbachev's power by limiting the maneuverability of his political oppo-
sition. In all likelihood, however, the USSR will not become a member
of either the GATT or the IMF in the near or immediate future. The
political and economic barriers to Soviet membership are formidable.
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